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Book Review
Liberal Nationalism
By Yael Tamir
Princeton University Press, 1993, 167 pp.
Is Liberal Nationalism An Oxymoron?
RALPH GAEBLER*

In this review, Mr. Gaebler addressesthe claim that nationalism can
supply a sense of community to those who live in liberalsocieties. He
concludes that nationalism is fundamentally incompatible with the
liberal values of individualism and tolerance, but that the argument
presented in Liberal Nationalsim provides a useful critique of
liberalism'sculturalandpsychological deficits. He suggests that neoAristotelian ethics offers a better description of liberal community
than that afforded by nationalism.
Not so very long ago, nationalism was commonly viewed as a spent force
in world politics. However, its spectacular comeback in central and eastem
Europe five years ago proved this view a chimera. We now know that
nationalism was not extinguished, but merely suppressed under the political
hegemony exercised by the Soviet Union in that area of the world following
the Second World War. When the Soviet empire suddenly evaporated, the
embers of nationalism flared freely back to life.
Today, the reemergence of nationalism exercises a peculiar allure for
political philosophers in the West who are dissatisfied with the alleged
deficiencies of liberalism. Graham Walker, for example, deplores the neutral
state's tendency to relativize all substantive commitments by viewing them as
purely a private matter of personal choice. "As a formal matter," he states,
"[the U.S. Constitution] makes authority neutral between religion and
irreligion, [but] in fact it makes the state into a promoter of religious
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indifference or religious relativism."' In other words, the state "trivializes"
religious belief by robbing it of its epistemological bite.2
Walker looks to constitution-making in central and eastern Europe as an
opportunity to mine nationalism for fresh ideas more congenial to his moral
outlook. In fact, Walker explicitly recommends a kind of constitutionalism
that deliberately mixes liberal and non-liberal values. Boiled down to its
essence, this kind of constitutionalism rests on a single fundamental premise,
which Walker describes as "explicit constitutional preference for a non-liberal,
communal value should be constructed [s]o as to deter the legal or political
abolition of dissenting alternatives (except in the case of dissenters whose
value systems exalt murder, genocide, torture, theft, and slavery)."3 However,
as sensible as his proposal appears at first blush, Walker fails to explain why
mixed constitutionalism would necessarily be any more attractive to
constitution-makers in central and eastern Europe than the full-blown liberal
variety. He argues that "a state can favor one side of a value polarity without
having to go so far as to outlaw the other,"' but this explanation merely
assumes away the nettlesome circumstances of political and cultural life in
eastern Europe that he initially set out to address.
Walker's proposal, therefore, is lacking in two respects. First, it fails to
explain why nationalists should adopt it. Even more fundamentally, it fails to
explain how nationalism and liberalism can be reconciled and then blended
together in the manner Walker suggests. Without such an explanation, liberals
are left with a deeply skeptical impression of nationalism as little more than a
totalitarian urge.
In her recent book, Liberal Nationalism, Yael Tamir addresses precisely
this issue from a fundamentally liberal perspective.'
She attempts to
demonstrate that liberalism and nationalism are not only reconcilable but even
complementary, or as she puts it, "no individual can be context-free, but...
all can be free within a context."' The critical move in her argument is to
stipulate a benign form of nationalism, which aspires to cultural rather than

1. Graham Walker, The New Mixed Constitution: A Response to Liberal Debility & Constitutional
Deadlock in Eastern Europe,26 POLrrY 503, 508, 511 (1994).
2. The assertion that values relativized to individual preference are epistemically trivial is at the heart
of a highly interesting debate between moral realists and moral relativists. However, a description of that
debate lies beyond the scope of the issues discussed in this review.
3. Id at 511-12.
4. Id.at 512.
5. YAEL TAMIR, LmEtRAL NATIONALISM (1993).
6. Id.at 14.
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political self-determination. With that stipulation, she endorses liberal
nationalism not only for those countries currently torn apart by ethnic and
religious conflict, but for all countries, and confidently predicts that "political
entities" based upon it will replace the nation-state as we know it.'
Ultimately, Tamir's ambitious undertaking must be judged a failure. Her
stipulated form of nationalism, as a kind of voluntary association, is
insupportable in a world still plagued by "ethnic cleansing." Indeed, one could
argue that ethnic intolerance has been one of the identifying hallmarks of
nationalism throughout its history.
Moreover, it is indisputable that
nationalism has always been driven by the desire for political, not merely
cultural self-determination."
But despite its ultimate failure, Liberal
Nationalismis still useful in the same way a failed scientific experiment might
be useful to demonstrate the falsity of a proposed hypothesis; along the way,
Tamir offers a far more trenchant critique of liberalism than vague,
communitarian bromides have yet been able to deliver.
Tamir begins by arguing that the development of personal identity depends
upon achieving both autonomy and cultural embeddedness. Although apparent
opposites, emphasizing reflection and choice on the one hand and community
solidarity on the other, she claims these two ideals actually stand in a mutually
dependent and dialectical relationship. The relationship is dialectical because
membership within a particular cultural community is both a precondition and
an object of choice. It is a precondition because choice can only be exercised
with respect to the cultural community one already knows, and it is an object
because community identity is, at least to some degree, a matter of choice not
fate. Tamir refers to phenomena such as "identity renewal" and "assimilation"
to illustrate this latter point.'
It is important to note that Tamir's theory of personal identity is
fundamentally liberal, in that community membership is ultimately reduced to
a matter of choice."° The elective dimension of cultural identity is emphasized
by Tamir's claim that the "right to culture," as she puts it, involves the right to

7. See e.g., id.at 151. See generally, id at 149-167.
8. Hans Kohn has argued that nationalism, by definition, is ethnocentric and political. "What remains
constant in nationalism through all its changes is the demand of the people for a government of the same
ethnic complexion as the majority. Every people awakened to nationalism sees political self-determination
as its goal." Cultural self-determination, by contrast, merely "precedes the quest for political selfdetermination and prepares the ground for the latter." Hans Kohn, Nationalism, in I1 INTERNATIONAL
ENCYCLOPEDIA OFTHE SOCIAL SCIENCES 63, 65 (David L. Sills ed., 1968).
9. TAMtR, supra note 5, at 29.
10. In this respect, Tamir differs markedly from critics, such as Walker, who view ethical relativism
as a barrier to the formation of cultural identity.
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re-create culture, as well as to identify with one that is already wellestablished." Yet her reason for interpolating nationalist values into liberalism
is partly to replace liberalism's notoriously weak description of human
psychology with something that better reflects human motivation and
behavior. Like communitarians and civic republicans, Tamir cannot accept a
description of human beings as rational calculators who operate from the
vantage point of egoistic self-interest. She prefers a richer description that
recognizes the importance of shared cultural life to human well-being.
At the same time, Tamir seeks to define and to limit the right to culture by
reference to liberal theory. This involves two important claims. First, the right
to culture can only be justified by reference to the value individuals find in
cultural identity. 2 As a result, the enjoyment of one's culture implies "a state
of mind characterized by tolerance [of] and respect [for] diversity" both within
one's own group and among those who are outsiders. 3 Those who strongly
identify with one culture should nevertheless be able to "respect and value
commitments similar to their own in other people.., without viewing them
as competitors."' 4 Liberal theory thus distinguishes the celebration of cultural
solidarity from unsavory nationalist movements, such as Nazi fascism, which
do not ground their claims in universal theory, but in particularist claims about
such issues as racial purity and historical destiny. Nationalist movements
based on justifications such as these lack any principled, internal check on
their' intolerance of other cultures.
The right to culture is limited in another important respect, as well.
Cultural choices belong to a category of choices that are important because
they are constitutive of identity, but they do not win in every clash with other
choices, even non-constitutive ones. For example, a small group of kosher
Jews wishing to eat only ritually prepared meats may not be able to do so
because they are too expensive without obtaining an unfairly large subsidy
from the rest of the community. 5 This would constitute an "external" limit on
the exercise of the right to culture, and would in this case result from the Jews'
bad luck in belonging to a locally very small minority. "Internal" limits might
also defeat a particular cultural practice as when, for example, only five male

11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

TAMIR, supranote 5, at 49.
Id at 83.
Id at 90.
Id. at 94.
Id at41.
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Jews are available, yet the conduct of public prayers requires the presence of
6
ten.1
Despite these limitations, Tamir insists that the right to culture is only
meaningful if individuals have a right to express their cultural identity in
public. As she puts it, "[R]efusing individuals the right to express their culture
in the public sphere in compliance with the ruling culture compels them to
forgo their identity."' 7 Thus, Tamir would support the right to wear religious
dress to school and the right to hear prayers at important events such as
graduation, as long as prayers for all religious groups wishing to participate
were included. Moreover, should the state choose to subsidize a particular
culture directly, the right to culture would justify the introduction of some
means to divide the subsidy between all cultures on a pro rata basis. 8
As previously noted, Tamir hesitates to address the political implications
of the right to culture. Indeed, she states that "the right to national selfdetermination is merely a particular case of the right to culture."' 9 As such, it
implies the existence of a definite public space for the autonomous pursuit of
cultural activities. Beyond that, Tamir becomes extremely vague. We know
only that the right to self-determination does not necessarily entail sovereign
statehood, and that it "can be satisfied through a variety of political
arrangements."2 The problem here is that Tamir does not want to view the
exercise of political power as vital to the enjoyment of culture for fear that it
16. Id. at 55. One issue Tamir does not adequately address relates to the definition of cultural
practice. In determining whether to accommodate a particular practice, how is the relevant authority to
distinguish between authentic practice and conduct that is merely idiosyncratic or eccentric? Tamir's answer
is that "proof that a certain practice plays a constitutive role in the history of a certain [culture] should count
as an argument in favour of allowing individuals to adhere to it." Id.at 39-40. On the other hand, Tamir's
claim that individuals have a right to re-create culture suggests that individuals should not be limited in selfexpression to what has already been accepted as part of a tradition. One partial solution to this contradiction
is to regard individuals who make unique claims not as eccentric, but as cultural minorities of one. In many
instances their claims could be defeated simply by showing that the cost of accommodation would far
outweigh the benefit conferred. However, there would still be other instances where the cost-benefit ratio
is not greatly affected by the size of the minority group,
17. Id. at 54.
18. Id.
at 55.
19. Id.at 73.
20. Id. at 75. In her last chapter, Tamir does attempt to sketch the future shape of "political entities"
based on liberal nationalism. She foresees the demise of nation-states in favor of both larger and smaller
political groupings. On the local level, autonomous, national communities will make cultural policy, while
power to make ecological, strategic, and economic decisions will attach to supranational, regional
organizations. However, this chapter is largely disappointing because the relationship between the two
levels is left completely unclear. Can decision-making power realistically be divided up in this fashion?
Will the local, national communities be sovereign in any way? Will they be multi-national? Even general
questions such as these are not addressed.
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would undermine her vision of multiple nations cooperating within a single
"political entity." As a result, her concept of nationalism as a form of cultural
voluntarism does not really justify any political arrangements beyond those
already embodied in the neutral state.
Although Tamir says little about the political shape of national selfdetermination, she has much to say about its character. As a special instance
of the more general right to culture, the right to national self-determination is
limited in precisely the same manner. Thus Tamir characterizes liberal
nationalism as "polycentric"' and "pluralistic"' by definition. It "cherishes
the open society."23 Relations among nations are governed by the principle
that each is to have the greatest amount of autonomy compatible with a similar
degree of autonomy for all. Thus a nation-state can restrict immigration in
order to preserve cultural homogeneity, but only if it has fulfilled an obligation
to help assure equality among all nations and only if would-be immigrant
minorities have an alternative destination where they could enjoy membership
in a national majority.24 Tamir believes that liberal nationalism has a natural
moderating effect on cultural claims, through "reiterative universalism," or the
recognition that others have motives and goals similar to one's own.25
However, it is important to note that her view of relations among nations could
lead to arguably harsh results. For example, Quebec's policy of attempting to
snuff out its existing anglophone community by discouraging Englishspeaking immigrants would be entirely justified. 6
To return to Walker's formulation of the issue, does Tamir succeed at
demonstrating why a dominant cultural group would accept a constitution that
"deter[s] the legal or political abolition of dissenting alternatives ...

?" As

21. Id at 93.
22. Id.
at 90.
23. Id.at 80.
24. Id.
at 160-61.
25. Id at 90.
26. Quebec has primary control over immigration to the province under an agreement most recently
negotiated with the Government of Canada in 1991. Under the terms of this agreement and its implementing
legislation, immigrants to Quebec must contribute to Quebec's "distinct identity." See IMMIGRATION
CANADA, CANADA-QUEBEC ACCORD RELATING TO IMMIGRATION AND TEMPORARY ADMISSION OF ALIENS,

pmbl., Annex A(IV)(14) (Can.-Quebec). It is arguable that Tamir's principle of national self-preservation
would also support Quebec's policy of barring access to English language schools to all but those whose
parents are native-born, English-speaking Quebecers. CHARTER OF THE FRENCH LANGUAGE, R.S.Q. (1977)
Ch. C- 11,
§ 73. The Canadian Supreme Court held this provision unconstitutional with respect to excluded
English-speaking Canadian natives, as a violation of section 23 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms.
Quebec Ass "nof ProtestantSchool Boardset al. v. A.-G. Que. (No.2), 1984 (2) S.C.R. 66. However, nonEnglish-speaking Canadian natives and immigrants must still obtain permission to have their children
educated in English.
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just noted, in attempting to separate culture from politics, Tamir implicitly
endorses the even more liberal formulation of a completely neutral state.
Therefore, she is committed to demonstrating at least as great a capacity for
tolerance in nationalism as Walker's formulation demands. However, Tamir's
argument up to this point is purely descriptive, turning on an assumption that
the achievement of cultural identity will be viewed as an element of
"individual self-authorship." But Tamir provides nothing to support this
assumption, other than "reiterative universalism;" and the facts of cultural life
today, as throughout the twentieth century, seem to belie it.
Tamir finds her answer in what she calls the "morality of community.""7
One should keep in mind that cultural identity, for Tamir, is not merely
descriptive, but normative. That is, it generates moral duties. In general,
acceptance of membership in a national community "implies the reflective
acceptance of an ongoing commitment to participate in a critical debate about
the nature of the national culture . . ."" More specifically, it generates
"associative obligations," which flow from our intuitive belief that we owe a
special duty of sympathy and care to those with whom we share a communal
tie or personal attachment. This special set of obligations differentiates
Tamir's ethics from Rawlsian principles of justice, which reject the idea that
one owes special duties to particular others. Yet Tamir argues that
"associative obligations" are fully compatible with Rawlsian principles, and
even lead to "a much greater commitment to global justice than that advocated
by most liberal writers."'29
The basic claim underlying the morality of community is that moral duty
should be grounded on care or affection, rather than mutual disinterestedness
or rational egoism. In other words, individuals are not required to overcome

27. TAMIR, supranote 5, at 90, 95-116.
28. Id.
at 89.
29. Id at 96. The liberalism of Rawls can be identified as a species of hypothetical contractarianism,
according to which principles of right conduct reflect the agreement rational people would ideally come to
using fair procedures and uninfluenced by prejudice. In other words, principles of right conduct emerge
from an authoritative reasoning process and can therefore be deemed universal. The universal principles of
right conduct that emerge from Rawls' hypothetical social contract constitute a qualified form of the rational
egoism typical of liberal philosophy generally. It is individualistic, both in its assumption that moral
conduct must be justified by reference to the needs of individuals, and in its assumption that individual need
will be determined by self-interest. However, Rawlsian liberalism results in a form of redistributive justice
nevertheless, because an impartial moral agent would naturally recognize the needs of others. Tamir uses
Rawls as a foil to establish the framework of her argument. She endorses his substantive principles of
redistributive justice, but rejects his effort to justify them on the basis of a hypothetical agreement between
impartial moral agents. Indeed, the crux of her argument is that true moral agency presupposes a range of
human attachments that render impartiality an undesirable ideal.
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their partiality. To the contrary, partiality is the building block of moral
decision-making. Tamir puts it this way:
[The morality of community] rejects the view that to reason ethically,
to consider things from a moral point of view, means to rely
exclusively on an impartialstandpoint, and argues that the essence of
morality does not concern the ways in which an impersonal,
disinterested self acts toward impersonal and equally disinterested
others, but rather the ways in which moral agents, bound by ties and
relationships, confront other, no less situated persons.3 0
But if individuals are permitted to indulge their preferences, and to treat
people they feel connected to differently than those to whom they have no
connection, how do they develop the tolerance of others that would be
necessary in a state with a mixed or fully liberal constitution? Tamir's answer
is basically two-part. First, she claims that people are risk-averse and will tend
to accept "the alternative the worst outcome of which is superior to the worst
outcomes of the others."'" Second, she claims that people's risk-aversion will
be deepened by several considerations. One such consideration is the
possibility that one's own position will change for the worse, particularly in a
mobile society. Another is that the moral agent will have to consider the
preferences and interests of others. First the moral agent has to consider the
preference of those to whom he has an immediate cfonnection, then of those
who are in a position to influence the well-being of the former. "The spread
of care thus looks like a set of concentric circles--individuals care most about
those in the circle closest to the centre, but are not indifferent to the welfare of
those who occupy farther positions."32 As a result, the moral agent will be
carried away from his immediate ends and will come to understand and defend
a much broader range of ends. Tamir refers to this phenomenon as
"transitivity."33 As a result of transitivity, people will be guided by Rawlsian
principles of justice, and social institutions will end up being impartial as
between different conceptions of the good that members of the same political
community might endorse.

30.
31.
32.
33.

Id at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

106.
107 (citing JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1972)).
109.
111.

1995]

BOOK REVIEW

But what about moral agents who live in a society much less mobile and
cosmopolitan than our own? Tamir herself reminds us that the right to culture
belongs also to those who have no interest in leading a liberal life,3 4 and that
illiberal communities generate associative obligations just as surely as liberal
ones do.35 Will transitivity occur in such communities in sufficient degree to
generate real tolerance? Tamir's answer is that the quest for a morality of
community that can reconcile liberalism and nationalism is "theoretical."36 It
might indeed be rational in closed societies for members "to protect only the
interests of their own ingroup."37 In other words, there is no reason to assume
that nationalists would find mixed constitutionalism palatable, much less the
neutral state.
Thus, Tamir appears to fail at her main task, in so far as she seriously
recommends liberal nationalism as a cure for ethnic and religious strife around
the world.3" However, the concept of associative obligation is still useftil, and
Tamir demonstrates that something like it is necessary to make Rawlsian
liberalism work. Specifically, she points to three problems inherent to
liberalism, each of which can only be overcome by assuming the existence of
associative obligations. First, she argues that inward-oriented policies of
distributive justice are unwarranted in the modem, liberal welfare state,
without some notion of communal loyalty to justify discrimination against
non-members. The principle of equal respect and concern, without more,
would advocate a global scheme of redistribution across political boundaries.
Even more fundamentally, liberalism has no means of demarcating boundaries
between members and non-members. The contract theory underlying
liberalism simply takes the existence of a group for granted, with the result that
voluntary consent to join in political association is completely hypothetical.
Moreover, even if voluntary consent is taken seriously, liberalism has no
reason to limit who can join. Contractarian principles provide no basis for
disregarding the interests of others, and membership should be open to all.
Finally, Tamir points out the problematic nature of political obligation in the
liberal state. If obligation is viewed as a matter of free, rational choice, why

34. Id.at 31-32, 71.
35. Id.at 101.
36. Id. at 104.
37. Id.at 110.
38. At one point, Tamir seems to endorse complete cultural and political separation as a legitimate
nationalist goal. See, id. at 123. However, this would render the entire project of liberal nationalism
superfluous.
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should the moral agent feel bound to his state, rather than to whichever one has
the fairest government?
In each of these cases, liberalism cannot get off the ground without
presupposing the existence of associative obligations. In light of this critique,
perhaps Tamir's book is best read as a contribution to the psychology of
liberalism. For she demonstrates effectively that a much richer explanation of
human motives and interests must be read into liberalism, and that this can be
accomplished without disturbing Rawlsian principles of justice. That is an
important accomplishment. 9
However, the question remains whether nationalism is the best source from
which to derive our enriched characterization of human motives and interests.
Tamir seems peculiarly bound to the notion that our quest for meaning within
a community can only be supplied by identification with a cultural or ethnic
group. I would argue that Tamir's recipe is still not rich enough to encompass
the full range of meaningful, communal interaction. Moreover, despite Tamir's
theoretical elaboration of the morality of community, it would be foolhardy to
ignore the dismal record on nationalism in the twentieth century.
Neo-Aristotelian ethics offers a different, and to my mind preferable,
means to achieve the enriching effect sought by Tamir. Emphasizing the role
of emotion in the development and exercise of judgment, as well as the
importance of particular circumstances in the shaping of moral choice,
practical reason, or phronesis, is similar to the morality of community in many
respects.4" Most importantly, it shares the conviction that the ideal vantage
point from which to make moral decisions is not some Olympian impartiality,
but rather a deep and reflective involvement in one's own particularity. To put
it slightly differently, moral judgment is not the sure result of a rational
procedure, but a matter of conjecture, given one's experience and current
circumstances. It is always tentative, always open to revision, as new
circumstances arise.
Like Tamir's nationalism, neo-Aristotelianism can, in theory, engender a
deep sense of commitment to community as the context in which one develops
character and moral judgment. Accordingly, each moral agent will share a
39. Tamir employs Rawls as the archetype of liberalism for the purpose of demonstrating her thesis
that nationalism and liberalism are compatible She thus runs the risk of being construed simply an apologist
for a modified form of Rawlsian liberalism. However, it is important to keep in mind that her observations
about the need for, and possibility of, psychologically enhanced liberalism stand on their own, quite aside
from her specific endorsement of redistributionist principles of justice.
40. See, e.g., MARTHA NUSSBAUM, THE FRAGILrrY OF GOODNESS (1986) (especially chapters eight,
ten and twelve); NANCY SHERMAN, THE FABRIC OF CHARACTER (1989).
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kinship with those particular others whose experiences overlap and help shape
his own and ultimately with all who have developed in similar circumstances.
What emerges from this is a reflective community, but not necessarily one in
which ties are derived from specific, shared cultural beliefs. It is a community
which truly cherishes individual self-authorship as the source of all happiness
and virtue. Nationalism, by way of contrast, seems to require the surrender of
individual identity, or at least the equation of individual identity with that of
the cultural group to which one belongs."' That is not an impulse that liberals
should welcome.
In sum, Tamir cannot demonstrate the compatibility of nationalism and
liberalism. Truly liberal nationalism does not supply a rationale for any
special political or cultural entity; and the nationalism that does is of a sort no
liberal could endorse. However, despite the shortcomings of Liberal
Nationalism, Tamir succeeds admirably at forcing those who read this book to
deepen and clarify their own ideas about liberalism. It is an engaging book,
one that will repay those who make the effort to read it closely.

41. Tamir mentions Jesse Owens' accomplishments at the 1936 Olympic Games as a "national
victory." Id. at 85. Similarly, she argues that the "well-being" and "self-esteem" of members of the Israeli
community were affected when S.Y. Agnon was awarded the Nobel Prize for literature. Id at 96. Although
superficial, these examples do reveal the degree to which, even by Tamir's admission, nationalism involves
an equation of the individual and the group.

